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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a landmark federal law
which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.1 In three momentous cases, argued
before the United States Supreme Court in the October 2019 term, the
Court will decide whether Title VII's prohibition of discrimination
"because of sex" necessarily includes a prohibition of discrimination
based on sexual orientation as well as a prohibition of discrimination
based on gender identity or transgender status. 2 The Supreme Court
granted petitions for writ of certiorari in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,
Bostock v. Clayton County Boardof Commissioners, and EEOC v. R. G.
& G.R. HarrisFuneralHomes, Inc. 3 All three cases involve the statutory

interpretation of Title VII's prohibition of employment discrimination

1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2020).
2. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2nd Cir. 2001), rev'den bane, 883 F.3d
100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en bane), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (examining the parameters of
Title VII when an employee revealed his sexual orientation to a customer and was subsequently

fired); see also Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 723 F. App'x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), (en
bane), 894 F.3d 1335 (2018), cert. granted,2019 U.S. LEXIS 2927 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2019) (discussing
whether an employee's termination was lawful when the reasons for termination included his sexual

orientation); EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert.
granted, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2846 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2019) (evaluating the lawfulness of a funeral
home's actions when it fired a woman after she informed the funeral home that she was a
transgender woman).

3.

883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); see 723 F. App'x at 964 (holding

that binding precedent foreclosed a Title VII action based on sexual orientation discrimination);
see also 884 F.3d at 560 (holding that discrimination on the basis of transgender status is necessarily
discrimination because of sex under Title VII).
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against any individual "because of such individual's . .. sex." 4 This
article will briefly highlight some of the important decisions holding that
Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination encompasses discrimination
based on gender identity and sexual orientation. As an attorney who
worked closely on these issues for the last fifteen or more years and
attended the Supreme Court oral arguments for the three cases on October
8, 2019, I will also offer my personal observations and perspectives about

these issues. The views expressed in this article are my personal views
and not that of my employer.
I.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT CLARIFIES THE RELEVANCE
OF GENDER STEREOTYPING UNDER TITLE VII

Gender stereotyping refers generally to beliefs, perceptions, or
expectations about the role, appearance, and behavior of men and
women. 5 The existence of conduct based on gender stereotypes can
provide proof that an employment decision or abusive environment is
motivated by a sex-based factor and in violation of Title VII. 6 For
example,

gender

stereotyping

provides

evidence

to

prove

sex

discrimination when an employer denies a promotion to a woman because
she walks like a man, talks in a deep voice, does not wear make-up,
jewelry, or a traditionally feminine haircut.7 If the employer considers
such "masculine mannerisms and traits" in an adverse employment
decision, the employer has taken gender into account in making an
employment decision.'

4.
5.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2020).
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989) (discussing that the Policy

Board in making its decision did in fact take into consideration comments from partners that were
solely motivated by stereotypical notions about women's proper deportment).
6.

See generally id ("Price Waterhouse also charges that Hopkins produced no evidence

that sex stereotyping played a role in the decision to place her candidacy on hold. As we have
stressed, however, Hopkins showed that the partnership solicited evaluations from all of the firm's
partners . .
including the comments that were motivated by stereotypical notions about women's
proper deportment.").
7.

See id ("[Sex stereotyping does not] require expertise in psychology to know that, if an

employee's flawed "interpersonal skills" can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of
lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the

criticism.").
8. See id at 239 (evaluating on the many factors that go into an employer's administrative
decisions relating to employees).
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Gender stereotyping also may prove a sex-based hostile work
environment; for example, an effeminate male repeatedly insulted by coworkers as "she" and "her," or "faggot" and "female whore" has a
legitimate hostile work environment claim. 9 Such harassment occurs
"because of sex" in that the employee is harassed because he is a man
who, in the view of the harassers, looks and acts effeminately. 1 Gender
has been taken into account in subjecting the employee to a hostile work
"

environment.
In a 1978 Title VII case, City of Los Angeles v. Manhart,the Supreme
Court made the following pronouncement:
It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated
on mere 'stereotyped' impressions about the characteristics of males or
females . . . . 'In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes .... ' Sprogis v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc.1 2 Myths and purely
habitual assumptions about [men or women] . . are no longer acceptable
reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying them
less . . . . Even a true generalization about the [protected] class is an
insufficient reason for disqualifying
generalization does not apply.13

an individual

to

whom

the

Later, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court expounded

on the legal relevance of such "sex stereotyping," and how conduct based
on sex stereotyping is considered evidence of sex discrimination under
Title VII:
In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not
be, has acted on the basis of gender .... [W]e are beyond the day when
9.

See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter. Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing the

systemic abuse suffered by an individual who did not conform to his co-workers' stereotyped
expectations of masculinity).
10.

See id (portraying a situation where there was harassment "because of sex"); see also

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2

(2020) (outlining unlawful employment practices

regarding sex discrimination).
11.

See id at 871 (holding "it is ...

now clear that sexual harassment in the form of a hostile

work environment constitutes sex discrimination").

12. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1978) (citing Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
13. Id
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an employer could evaluate employees by insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group ... .14

In that case, a female employee named Ann Hopkins, was denied
partnership at an accounting firm based, in part, on the evaluative
comments submitted by several partners to the "Policy Board." 1 5 These
partners' comments, according to the Supreme Court, "overtly referred to
her failure to conform to certain gender stereotypes as a factor militating
against her election to partnership." 1 6 For example, "[o]ne partner
described her as 'macho . . . [another] advised her to take 'a course at
charm school.'"1 7 Moreover, in what the Supreme Court called the coup

de grace, the partner, who explained to Ms. Hopkins the reasons for
denying her partnership, advised her to "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry." 1 8
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had clearly erred
in finding insufficient evidence of sex stereotyping, and that sex
stereotyping had played a part in the partnership decision. 19 First, the

Court emphasized that the expert testimony presented on behalf of
Hopkins regarding sex stereotyping "was merely icing on Hopkins'

cake,"

because

the

partners'

comments

obviously

"stereotypical notions about women's proper deportment."

20

constituted
According

to the Court, "[i]t takes no [expert] to discern sex stereotyping in a
description of an aggressive female employee as requiring 'a course at

charm school."' 2 1 Second, the Court concluded Price Waterhouse
undoubtedly took these comments into account in deciding to put
Hopkins' partnership on hold-as it had solicited and relied on its
partners' evaluations and did not disclaim reliance on the sex stereotyping
comments. 2 2 According to the Court, Price Waterhouse was liable for

14.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.

15. Id
Id. at 273 (O'Connor, S., concurring).
17. Id at 235.
18. Id
19. Id at 237-38.
20. See id at 256 (elaborating on Hopkins' testimony and why she interpreted the partner's
16.

written comments evaluating her candidacy for partnership as sex stereotyping).

21. Id
22.

Id at 251, 257.
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sex discrimination based on sex stereotyping, thus, in violation of Title
VII. 23
II.

TITLE VII DOES NOT EXCLUDE GENDER STEREOTYPING
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS WHERE THE FACTS SHOW
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION

Smith v. City of Salem is an important Sixth Circuit decision, applying

Title VII to factual circumstances which plainly showed discrimination
based on transgender status. 24 In Smith, a transgender firefighter, Jimmie

Smith, contended that the employer had engaged in discrimination based
on sex in violation of Title VII, "because of... gender non-conforming
conduct and, more generally because of... identification as a
transsexual." 2

Because Smith failed to state a claim of sex stereotyping

under Price Waterhouse based on transsexuality, the district court held
that Smith was excluded from Title VII's protection. 2 6 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and specifically disapproved of the district
court's implication that Smith had disingenuously invoked the sex
stereotyping term-of-art to run around the "real" claim, which was based
on transgender status. 2 7
The Sixth Circuit held that Smith's complaint sufficiently pled the
gender stereotyping claim by alleging (1) that co-workers began
commenting on her appearance, expressing a more feminine manner due

to being a transgender woman and (2) that her employer schemed to force
her resignation. 2 8
It follows [from Price Waterhouse] that employers who discriminate

against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the
discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex. 2 9

23.
24.

Id at258.
See 378 F.3d 566, 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing the application of Title VII when

a trans woman lieutenant was suspended because of her gender non-conforming behavior).

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2004).

Id at 569.
Id at 571, 575, 578.
Id at 572.
Id at 574.
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In sustaining Smith's gender stereotyping claim, the court made clear
that Smith's transgender status did not exclude Smith from Title VII
coverage:
[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual-and therefore fails
to act like and/or identify with the gender norms associated with his or her
sex-is no different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins
in Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a
woman. Sex stereotyping based on a person's gender non-conforming

behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that
behavior; a label, such as "transsexual," is not fatal to a sex discrimination
claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her
gender non-conformity. 3 0

Similar to the Sixth Circuit's application of Price Waterhouse to Smith,

three other circuit courts of appeals have held that acts of discrimination
on the basis of sex include discrimination based on gender identity.3 1
III.

DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF TRANSGENDER STATUS IS ITSELF

NECESSARILY DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF

SEX-AIMEE

STEPHENS

In EEOC v. R. G. & G.R. HarrisFuneralHomes, Inc., the Sixth Circuit

held that sex discrimination under Title VII included discrimination of
transgender persons based on their transgender or transitioning status.32
In this case, Aimee Stephens, a transgender funeral director, was
terminated from her employment by Thomas Rost, a funeral home's
owner.3 3 Shortly before being fired, Stephens informed Rost that, due to
her transition from male to female, she should represent and dress as a

30.
31.

Id. at 575.
See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2018) ("Discrimination against a

transgender individual because of [their] gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it's
described as being on the basis of sex or gender."); see also Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214
F.3d 213, 215-16 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that disparate treatment between a man dressed as a
woman and a traditionally-dressed woman would fall into a prohibited category); Schwenk v.

Hartford, 203 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Under Price Waterhouse, 'sex' under Title VII
encompasses both sex that is, the biological differences between men and women and gender.
Discrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or woman is forbidden under

Title VII.") (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250).
32. 884 F.3d at 600 ("Discrimination against employees, either because of their failure to
conform to sex stereotypes or their transgender and transitioning status, is illegal under Title VII.").

33.

Id at566.
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woman in appropriate business attire while at work. 3 4 Rost admitted that
he fired Stephens because she was no longer representing as a man and
he wanted her to dress traditionally feminine. 3 5 The United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued the funeral home
alleging, among other things, that the funeral home violated Title VII by
terminating Stephens based on her transgender or transitioning status and
her refusal to conform to the owner's sex-based stereotypes.3 6
By denying the funeral home's Motion for Failure to State a Claim, the
district court determined that Stephens adequately stated a Title VII claim
due to her termination because of her failure to conform to sex-based
stereotypes. 3 7 Nevertheless, the district court limited the EEOC's pursuit
of its unlawful-termination claim, ruling that "transgender status is not a
protected trait under Title VII, and . .. the EEOC could not sue for

alleged discrimination . .. based solely on [Stephens'] transgender and/or
transitioning status." 3

8

However, the Sixth Circuit held that narrowing

the claim was erroneous because "[d]iscrimination on the basis of
transgender and transitioning status is necessarily discrimination on the
basis of sex" in violation of Title VII.3 9 Thus, Stephens could indeed
claim she was discriminated against on the basis of her transgender and
transitioning status alone. 40
A.

The Sex Stereotyping Claim

In affirming Stephens' sex stereotyping claim, the Sixth Circuit refuted
the funeral home's argument that its sex-specific dress code requiring
Stephens to abide by the male dress code did not constitute disparate
treatment in violation of Title VII-as the dress-code equally applied to
and burdened females. 4 1 The funeral home required women to wear skirt
suits and men to wear pant suits, and it viewed Stephens as a male who
was required to abide by the male dress code. 4 2 According to the court,
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 569.

at 570.
at 569-70.
at 571, 574-75.

40. See id at 600 (describing the ways in which Stephens was discriminated because of her
transgender and/or her transitioning status).

41.
42.

Id at 572-73.
Id at 568, 573.
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the question as to whether the funeral home's sex-specific dress code
violated Title VII was not the issue before it. 4 3 Rather, the question
before the court was whether the funeral home violated Title VII by
terminating Stephens-despite her intent to comply with the company's
sex-specific dress code-because she refused to conform to the funeral
home's notion of her sex.44
The Sixth Circuit held that the cases relied upon by the funeral home,
Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co. and Jesperson v. Harrah's Operating
Co., were incompatible or irreconcilable with Price Waterhouse and

Smith. 4 5 Barker endorsed the traditional concept of sex, but according
to the Sixth Circuit, Price Waterhouse eviscerated that traditional concept
in its recognition that, under Title VII, "[sex] encompasses both the
biological differences between men and women, and gender
discrimination, that is, discrimination based on failure to conform to
stereotypical gender norms. "46
Jespersen'sholding that Harrah's grooming standards-requiring only

female bartenders to wear makeup-directly conflicted with Smith. 4 7
Smith concluded that requiring women to wear makeup does constitute
improper sex stereotyping. 4 8 Moreover, the plaintiff in Smith was not

required to allege that being expected to adopt a more masculine
appearance and manner interfered with job performance. 4 9

43.

See id (attempting to narrow the issue in a way that excluded the discussion of Title

44.
45.

Id at 573.

VII).
Compare 549 F.2d 400, 401-02 (6th Cir. 1977) (describing why the sex-specific

grooming code allowing women but not men to wear long hair did not violate Title VII), and 444

F.3d 1104, 1109-11 (9th Cir. 2006) (understanding that no Title VII violation occurred where a
grooming code imposed different but equally burdensome requirements on males and females),
with 490 U.S. 228 (finding a Title VII violation where the decision to promote a senior manager
was refused based on sexual stereotypes of women), and378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that
allegations that an employee was discriminated against based upon the employee's gender nonconforming behavior and appearance were actionable pursuant to Title VII).

46. Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 402 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 256).
47. Compare 444 F.3d at 1112 (holding that grooming standards which required women to
wear makeup did not constitute a sex stereotype), with 378 F.3d at 566 (elaborating on why a
makeup requirement for women was, in fact, a sex stereotype).

48.

Smith, 378 F.3d at 571.

49. See id at 572 (stating that the employee need not indicate that the allegedly
discriminatory requirement interfered with the employee's job performance).
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Finally, the Sixth Circuit repudiated the funeral home's suggested
reading of Price Waterhouse and Smith, in that sex stereotyping violates
Title VII only when the employer's sex stereotyping results in disparate

treatment of men and women.SO In Smith, the court did not compare the
difference in treatment between transgender persons transitioning from
male to female and transgender persons transitioning from female to
male." Indeed, a defense by the employer in Price Waterhouse that it

fired both a gender non-conforming man and a gender non-conforming
woman would have failed because two wrongs do not make a right. 52
According to the Sixth Circuit, Price Waterhouse and Smith dictate that

"an employer engages in unlawful discrimination even if it expects both
biologically male and female employees to conform to certain notions of
how each should behave.""
B.

The Claim Based on Transgenderand TransitioningStatus

The Sixth Circuit set forth two reasons for its central holding that
discrimination on the basis of transgender and transitioning status
violates Title VII. 5 4 First, the court reasoned that it was impossible to
discriminate based on an employee's transgender status "without being
motivated, at least in part, by the employee's sex." 5 To illustrate this
point, the court asked "whether Stephens would have been fired if
Stephens had been a woman who sought to comply with the women's
dress code." 5 6 The obvious answer in the negative confirmed that
Stephens' sex impermissibly motivated her termination. 5 7 The court
called this "paradigmatic sex discrimination. "5

50. See R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d at 574 (describing the court's
resistance in using Price Waterhouse and Smith as limiting discrimination under Title VII).
51.

See id (describing that no difference was delineated in what sex was being transitioned

52.

See id (understanding that a defense as to similar discriminatory treatment will not stand

to).

against Title VII).
53. See id (citing Zarda, 883 F.3d at 123)
54. Id at 575-76.
55. Id at 575.
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id
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Further, the Court analogized discrimination based on religion to
discrimination based on sex in the workplace. 5 9 In doing so, the Court
explained that when an employer fires someone on the basis of their
religion, such an act constitutes discrimination under Title VII regardless
Discrimination on the basis of religion
of an employer's biases. 6
inherently encompasses discrimination on the basis of a change in
religion. 6 1 Using the same logic, it follows that discrimination on the
basis of a change of sex is inherently included in sex discrimination. 62
According to the Sixth Circuit, "discrimination because of a person's
transgender, intersex or sexually indeterminate status, is no less
actionable than discrimination because of a person's identification with
two religions, an unorthodox religion or no religion at all." 63 In Harris
FuneralHomes, the funeral home argued that the analogy to religion was

"structurally flawed" because a person's sex is "a biologically immutable
trait" which, unlike religion, cannot be changed. 6 4 Therefore, the court
held this to be an "immaterial" point that it did not need to decide. 6 5 The
Sixth Circuit reaffirmed Price Waterhouse's holding that sex should be

irrelevant to employment decisions and added that an employer's adverse
employment decision on the basis of a sex-change directly disobeys Price
Waterhouse.6 6

Second, the court reasoned that discrimination against transgender
persons "necessarily implicates Title VII's proscriptions against sex
As in Smith, the court recognized the American
stereotyping." 67

Psychiatric Association recognizes transgender status as a disjunction
between one's individual's sexual organs and sexual identity. 6 8 In other
words, "a transgender person is someone who . . is inherently 'gender
Because of this, the court concluded that an
non-conforming. '69
employer's discrimination because of transgender status always involves
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id at 575-76.
Id
Id at 575.
Id
Id at 575 n. 4.
Id at 576.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
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the employer's imposition of its stereotypes about the alignment of sexual
organs and gender identity.7" Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that
discrimination because of transgender or transitioning status is inherently
discrimination based on gender non-conformity in violation of Title
VII. 7 1
C.

The Sixth Circuit Rejects Arguments Against Interpreting Title VII
to Include Transgender Status Discrimination
In Harris Funeral Homes, the court specifically rejected several

arguments raised by the funeral home regarding Title VII's
interpretation.7 2 First, the funeral home argued that Congress, in
enacting Title VII, understood sex to refer only to physiology and
reproductive roles-and not to a person's gender identity.7 3 The Sixth
Circuit concluded, however, that Congress' failure to anticipate that Title
VII would cover transgender status had little interpretative value. 7
The Supreme Court teaches that "statutory prohibitions often go
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of
Such "reasonably
our legislators by which we are governed." 7
comparable evils" include same sex sexual harassment and hostile work
environment claims that Title VII now prohibits, but were initially

believed to fall outside its scope. 7 6 Moreover, according to the Sixth
Circuit, Price Waterhouse eviscerated the narrow or traditional view of

sex as referring only to "chromosomally driven physiology and
reproductive function" by recognizing that "sex" under Title VII refers
not only to biological differences but also to gender norms. 7 7 Thus, prePrice Waterhouse cases holding otherwise were no longer valid.

78

Second, the funeral home argued transgender status was not unique to
one's biological sex since both biologically male and biologically female
70. Id
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id
Id at 578.
Id at 577.
Id
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
Id at 80-81.
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d at 578-79.

78. See id at 578 (explaining why the reasoning in cases decided before Price Waterhouse
are directly counter to modern law).
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persons may consider themselves transgender.' 9 According to the Sixth
Circuit, however, "[a] trait need not be exclusive to one sex to
nevertheless be a function of sex." 80 To violate Title VII, an employer
need not discriminate based on a trait common to all men or all women.8 1
Instead, Title VII focuses on whether a particular individual is
discriminated against because of his or her sex, not on whether a
particular

sex

is

discriminated

against. 82

An

employer

who

discriminates against an employee based on transgender status is
necessarily considering that employee's biological sex, and thus
discriminating based on sex-this is so no matter what sex the employee
was born or wishes to be. 8 3
Finally, later statutes, such as the Violence Against Women Act, which
expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender identity, were
of little interpretative value to the Sixth Circuit. 8 4 This is because
Congress may choose to use a belt and suspenders method to achieve its
objectives.
IV.

85

MIXED RESULTS: TITLE VII SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

WHERE FACTS SHOW DISCRIMINATION BASED ON GENDER
NON-CONFORMITY DUE TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION

Before Price Waterhouse's clarification about the relevance of sex
stereotyping and the text-focused approach to statutory construction
applied to Title VII by Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., two

federal courts of appeals held that sexual orientation was excluded from
the purview of Title VII sex discrimination. 8 6 First, in Blum v. Gulf Oil
79. Id
80. Id
81. Id
82. See id at 574 (citing Zarda, 883 F.3d at 123); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (2020).
83. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d at 578.
84. Id
85. See id at 575 (quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 344
(7th Cir. 2017)).
86. See 490 U.S. at 251 (describing that "[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not
be, has acted on the basis of gender...."); see also 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding sex discrimination
consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,

597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that even if a prima facie case of sex
discrimination was presented, the employer had a legitimate reason for discharge which did not
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Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals summarily addressed the issue
in one sentence, stating: "[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited
by Title VII ... ."7 In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co." 8 However, the Smith holding
directly conflicts with the Price Waterhouse holding.8 9 Second, in
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., Inc., the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals held that Congress had not intended Title VII to apply
to sexual orientation and only had "traditional notions of 'sex' in
mind." 90 DeSantis, similar to Blum, also cites and relies on Smith. 91
In the decades following Price Waterhouse, courts have grappled with

Title VII sex discrimination suits where facts show there is discrimination
based on an employee's failure to conform to their gender due to being
gay or lesbian. 9 2 While parroting and mechanically following the view
that sexual orientation was outside of Title VII's purview, some courts
attempted to tease apart evidence of sex stereotyping from evidence of
sexual orientation discrimination. 93 For example, in Prowel v. Wise
Business Forms, Inc., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged

"the line between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination
'because of sex' can be difficult to draw." 9 4 Other courts have applied a
categorical exclusionary rule-dismissing claims based on gender

involve the employee's race, sex, or religion); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333
(9th Cir. 1979) (holding that homosexuals are not a protected class within the statutory meaning).

87. See 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d
325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978)).
88.

See

id

(dismissing a Title VII sex discrimination claim by a male who had been

terminated for being effeminate).

89.

Compare 569 F.2d at 325 (dismissing a Title VII sex discrimination claim by a male

who had been terminated for being effeminate), with 490 U.S. at 251 ("In the specific context of
sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive,
or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender .... ").

90. 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979).
91. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 332 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Blum v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)).
92. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228) (noting discrimination under Title VII can be difficult to
ascertain).
93. See id at 287, 291-92 (finding sufficient evidence to warrant a claim for harassment or
discrimination under Title VII while affirming the district court's holding that sexual orientation

discrimination is not cognizable under Title VII); see, e.g., Hively, 853 F.3d at 341
("[D]iscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.").

94.

579 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009).
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stereotyping evidence when such evidence was linked to or associated
with sexual orientation.9 5 In Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, for example,

the court stated as follows:
When utilized by an avowedly homosexual plaintiff, however, gender
stereotyping claims can easily present problems for an adjudicator. This is
for the simple reason that '[s]tereotypical notions about how men and
women should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about
heterosexuality and homosexuality.' . .
Like other courts we have
therefore recognized that a gender stereotyping claim should not be used
to "bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.96

Notably, this case law on Title VIl's coverage of sexual orientation as
a whole has been described as a "confused hodge-podge of cases," and
"an odd state of affairs"-where, for example, Title VII protects
effeminate men from employment discrimination but only if they are
straight and not gay. 9 7
V.

DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS

NECESSARILY DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF

SEX-DONALD

ZARDA

In Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals

confronted this confusion head-on: "we are persuaded that the line
between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is
difficult to draw because that line does not exist save as a lingering and
faulty judicial construct." 9 8 In Zarda, the Second Circuit, en banc, held

sexual orientation discrimination is a form or subset of sex discrimination
under Title VII because an employee's sex is necessarily a motivating
factor in sexual orientation discrimination.9 9 In the case, a gay skydiving instructor, Donald Zarda, told a female client while preparing for

95. See Hively, 830 F.3d at 344 (addressing a line of cases applying a categorical rule
against recognizing sexual orientation as a cognizable Title VII claim); see also Magnusson v. Cty.

of Suffolk, No. 14CV3449, 2016 WL 2889002, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2016) (describing that
"[s]exual orientation discrimination is not actionable under Title VII, and plaintiffs may not
shoehorn what are truly claims of sexual orientation discrimination into Title VII by framing them
as claims of discrimination based on gender stereotypes, as Plaintiff at times attempts to do here").

96.
97.
98.

398 F. 3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005).
Hively, 830 F.3d at 342-44.
883 F.3d at 122; see Hively, 853 F.3d at 346 (concluding "the line between a gender

nonconformity claim and one based on sexual orientation . .

99.

does not exist").

883 F.3d at 122.
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a tandem skydive that he was gay. 100 Because of this, the client alleged
Zarda "inappropriately touched her and disclosed his sexual orientation
to excuse his behavior." 1 0 1 Subsequently, the client told her boyfriend
who then informed Zarda's boss. 102 Zarda was subsequently fired.103
Zarda then sued his employer alleging sex discrimination under Title
VII on the ground that his non-conformity to male sex stereotypes
resulted in his termination.104 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the employer, concluding that precedent, such as
Dawson, indicated that Zarda had failed to establish a prima facie case
under Title VII because a gender stereotype claim cannot be predicated
on sexual orientation. 1 0 5 A Second Circuit panel subsequently
affirmed-declining to revisit binding precedent. 106
Sitting en banc, the Second Circuit reversed the panel's decision. 1 0 7
It provided several rationales in support of its holding that sexual
orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under Title
VII. 10s First, the court emphasized that sexual orientation, by its nature,
is sex-dependent: "[s]exual orientation is doubly delineated by sex
because it is a function of both a person's sex and the sex of those to
whom he or she is attracted." 1 0 9 Thus, firing a man, like Zarda, who is
attracted to men is a decision motivated, at least in part, by sex. 1 10
"Logically, because sexual orientation is a function of sex and sex is a
protected characteristic under Title VII, it follows that sexual orientation
is also protected." 1
Second, the court utilized a comparative test, asking "whether the
employee would have been treated differently 'but for' his or her sex." 1 1 2
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 108.

at
at
at
at
at

108-09.
107.
109.
109-10.
132.

108. See generally id at 111-32 (providing a thorough analysis on why discrimination
based on an individual's sexual orientation constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII).

109.
110.

Id at 113.
Id at 114.

111. Id at 113; see Hively, 853 F.3d at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring) ("One cannot consider
a person's homosexuality without also accounting for their sex .... ").

112.

Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119.
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In the context of sexual orientation-a man who is fired because he is
attracted to men-would not have been fired had he been a woman
attracted to men.1" 3 Notably, the court rejected the view that the proper
comparison should hold everything, including sexual orientation,
constant except sex-for example, an employer that discriminates based
on sexual orientation treats gay men the same as gay women, showing no
sex discrimination. 114

Accordingly, the court held that the proper purpose of the comparative
test is to determine whether a trait, such as sexual orientation, is a proxy
for sex. 15 As such, "[t]he trait [sexual orientation] is the control, sex is
the independent variable, and employee treatment is the dependent
variable." 1 1 6
Third, the court applied the reasoning in Price Waterhouse to sexual

orientation: "we concluded that when . .. [an employer] acts on the basis
of a belief that [men] cannot be [attracted to men], or that [they] must not
be,' but takes no such action against women who are attracted to men, the
employer 'has acted on the basis of gender."' 1 7 The court's application
of Price Waterhouse was consistent with the holding in Hively v. Ivy Tech
Community College-where the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held

that same-sex orientation represented the "ultimate case of failure to
conform" to the gender stereotype "that 'real' men should date women,
and not other men."

Even where negative views of gay persons are

rooted in morality, such moral beliefs cannot be disassociated from
beliefs about sex. 119
Thus, sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination under
Title VII because it implicates Price Waterhouse's proscription against

113. Id at 116; see Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (describing the comparative test as
"paradigmatic sex discrimination").
114.
orientation

See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 116 (recognizing that changing sex also changes sexual
thus showing that sexual orientation is interconnected with sex).

115. See id at 116-19 ("To determine whether a trait operates as a proxy for sex, we ask
whether the employee would have been treated differently 'but for' his or her sex.").

116. Id at 117, 119.
117. See id at 120-21 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250).
118. See id at 121 (quoting Hively, 853 F.3d at 346 and Centola v. Potter, 183 F.Supp.2d
403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002)).
119. See id at 122 ("Beliefs about sexual orientation necessarily take sex into consideration
and, by extension, moral beliefs about sexual orientation are necessarily predicated, in some degree,
on sex.").
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adverse employment actions based on gender stereotypes. 120 In Zarda,
the Second Circuit also rejected the view that sexual orientation
discrimination "is not barred by Price Waterhouse because it treats
women no worse than men." 1 2 1 Therefore, it follows that the employer
in Price Waterhouse could not have defended itself by firing both

effeminate men and masculine women. 122
Finally, the court reasoned that precedent discussing associational
discrimination supported its holding that sexual orientation
discrimination violated Title VII. 123 In doing so, the court reaffirmed
that, "[w]here an employee is subjected to adverse action because an
employer disapproves of interracial association, the employee suffers
discrimination because of the employee's own race." 1 2 4 For example,
when a white employee is fired for dating a black person, it constitutes
racial discrimination.

125

Such a conclusion is true because "the prohibition on associational
discrimination applies with equal force to all the classes protected by
Title VII, including sex." 12 6 Thus, firing a male employee for dating
another man constitutes sex discrimination.127 "In most contexts, where
an employer discriminates based on sexual orientation, the employer's
decision is predicated on opposition to romantic association between

120. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 346 ("A policy that discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation . .. is based on assumptions about the proper behavior for someone of a given sex"); cf
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51 (rejecting the notion that "sex stereotyping" lacks legal
relevance).
121.

See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 123 ("Price Waterhouse ...

stands for the proposition that

employers may not discriminate against women or men who fail to conform to conventional gender
norms."); cf Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 ("We are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group.").

122.

Zarda, 883 F.3d at 123.

123.

See id at 124 (acknowledging that associational discrimination extends to all classes

protected by Title VII).
124. See id (quoting Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008)).
125. See e.g., Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir.
1998) ("A reasonable juror could find that [Plaintiff] was discriminated against because of her race
(white), if that discrimination was premised on the fact that she, a white person, had a relationship
with a black person.").

126.

Zarda, 883 F.3d at 125.

127.

See id at 131 (holding that sex discrimination based on a person's sexual orientation

is cognizable under Title VII).
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particular sexes." 1 2 8 In Zarda, the Second Circuit blatantly rejected the
argument that whereas "anti-miscegenation policies are motivated by
racism, .

.

. sexual orientation discrimination is not rooted in sexism." 129

Such an argument was rejected because Title VII is not limited by the
colloquial concept of "sexism." 1 3 ' For example, in Oncale, the court
held that male-on-male sex harassment-a concept not traditionally seen
as sexism-violates Title VII.

131

Notably, in Zarda, the Second Circuit rejected arguments against
interpreting Title VII to include discrimination based on sexual
orientation. 132 Specifically, in the majority opinion, the court rejected
several arguments raised by the employer and the dissenting judges in
their opinions regarding Title VII's interpretation-many of which are
addressed above. 133 The court painstakingly rejected the dissent's
principal argument that interpreting Title VII to include sexual
orientation discrimination "misconceives the fundamental public
meaning of the language of' Title VII.

134

According to Judge Lynch's dissent in Zarda, Congress "intended to
secure the rights of women to equal protection in employment . .. [not]
to protect an entirely different category of people." 1 3 Judge Lynch also
argued that the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII regarding the
coverage of sex harassment and same-sex harassment "do not say
anything about whether discrimination based on other social categories
is covered . ."136 However, the majority opinion disagreed with this
128. Id at 124; see Hively, 853 F.3d at 349 (describing that "to the extent that the statute
prohibits discrimination on the basis of the race of someone with whom the plaintiff associates, it
also prohibits discrimination on the basis of... the sex of the associate.").

129.

Zarda, 883 F.3d at 126.

130. See id ("But the Court need not resolve this dispute because the amici supporting
defendants identify no cases indicating that the scope of Title VII's protection against sex
discrimination is limited to discrimination motivated by what would colloquially be described as
sexism").
131. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 (holding that a claim under Title VII is not barred merely
because the plaintiff and defendant are of the same sex); see also id at 127 (stating that Oncale
represents how male-on-male sexual harassment is not traditionally conceptualized as sexism).

132.

See generally Zarda, 883 F.3d at 115, 126-27 (holding that an employee had a

cognizable sex discrimination claim because his employer took adverse action against him due to
his failure to "conform to the straight male macho stereotype").

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id
See id at 137-39.
Id at 145.
Id at 147.
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statement and, relying on Oncale, eschewed reliance on divining

legislative intent. 137 Instead, the court was strictly guided by the lodestar
of statutory interpretation-the actual text of Title VII. 138 The court
viewed sexual orientation discrimination as a "reasonably comparable
evil" to sexual harassment and male-on-male harassment, which the
Supreme Court has held is plainly covered by the text of Title VII.139
VI. SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IS NOT PROHIBITED BY
TITLE VII BASED ON 39-YEAR-OLD PRECEDENT-GERALD BOSTOCK

In Bostock, the Eleventh Circuit issued a two-page per curiam opinion

and held that discrimination because of sexual orientation "is not
prohibited by Title VII." 14 ' There, a gay man, Gerald Bostock, worked
as a child welfare services coordinator for Clayton County. 141 He
performed exceedingly well at his job, earning the program multiple
accolades. 142 After Bostock joined a gay recreational softball league, he
was subjected to disparaging comments about his sexual orientation and
later fired. 143 Bostock sued alleging discrimination based on his sexual
orientation under Title VII. 144 The district court dismissed his claim,
citing Blum as binding precedent. 14 5 Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit

affirmed the dismissal of Bostock's claim and denied a rehearing. 146
VII.

A.

PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

The Court'sLegitimacy and the Credibilityof Textualism

Justice Neil M. Gorsuch's questions to counsel during Supreme Court
oral arguments received considerable press coverage over speculation
that his vote might be in play in favor of lesbian, gay, bisexual and

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
discharge

146.

Id at 115.
Id

Id at 132 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79).
723 F. App'x at 964.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id ; see Blum, 597 F.2d at 936 (holding that the employer had a legitimate reason for
even if a prima facie case of sex discrimination was presented).
Bostock, 723 F. App'x at 964, 965.
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transgender workers. 147 Specifically, Justice Gorsuch, asked Stephens'
counsel the following:
When a case is really close, really close, on the textual
evidence, . . assume for the moment . . I'm with you on the textual
evidence.... At the end of the day, should he or she take into
consideration the massive social upheaval that would be entailed in such a
decision, and the possibility that . . Congress didn't think about it . . and
that . . it is . . more appropriate a legislative rather than a judicial
function? 148

Earlier in his questioning to Stephens' counsel, Justice Gorsuch also
asked the following:
I'd just like you to have a chance to respond to Judge Lynch in his
thoughtful dissent in which he lamented everything you have before us, but
suggested that something as drastic a change in this country as bathrooms
in every place of employment and dress codes in every place of
employment that are otherwise gender neutral would be changed, .. . that's
an essentially legislative decision . . .. It's a question of judicial
modesty. 149

In response, counsel argued that (1) the 20-year-old appellate court's
recognition of transgender-based discrimination as sex discrimination has
not put an end to sex-specific dress codes and restrooms, and (2) Stephens
was requesting the Court to interpret Title VII's text as written and not
address a policy question more appropriate for Congress."15

Justice

Gorsuch, however, appeared unsatisfied with this answer when he asked,
"[d]id you want to address Judge Lynch's argument or not?" 15 1
When read in context, Justice Gorsuch's statement about textual
evidence being close appears inconsistent with his focus on Judge
Lynch's dissent, which clearly rejected the textualism analysis,
147.

Adam Liptak & Jeremy W. Peters, Supreme Court Considers Whether Civil Rights Act

ProtectsL.G.B.T. Workers, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/us/
politics/supreme-court-gay-transgender.html [https://perma.cc/DR5W-HZEH].
148.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 26-27, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v.

EEOC, 2019 WL 5087134 (2019) [Hereinafter HarrisFuneralHome Transcript].
149.

See id (referencing Judge Lynch's dissenting opinion in Zarda concerning the

appropriateness of judicial action in altering the meaning of Title VII in a way Congress did not
anticipate).

150.
151.

Id at 27-28.
Id at28.
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In Judge Lynch's view, reading Title

VII to encompass sexual orientation would not be an application of Title
VII's text, but an amendment to Title VII-a task more appropriate for
the legislature. 153 Despite Justice Gorsuch's statement about textual
evidence being close, his focus on Judge Lynch's dissent could indicate
his inclination to outright reject the textualism analysis. 154
A Supreme Court decision rejecting textual coverage but calling it
close will justifiably substantiate criticism about the undue influence of
ideological bias in the Court's decisions. 155 Similarly, such a decision
will also add credible evidence to bolster the criticism that textualism, as
a method of statutory interpretation, is not neutral-but in crucial respects
is subject to sham. 156 The arguments for textual coverage are strong and
straightforward. 157 Justice Gorsuch and Justice John Roberts, as
conservatives, presumably would wish to shore up the legitimacy of the
Court, as well as the credibility of textualism. 15 8 One of them will likely
provide the swing vote (joining the four liberal Justices), which
represents the best hope for an opinion to hold that coverage under Title
VII's plain text is clear. 159
During oral arguments, Justice Gorsuch also presented the issue of
whether the Court-where statutory coverage is a close call-should
152.

Id at 26-27; cf Zarda, 883 F.3d at 144 n.7 (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia, "[a]dhering

to the fair meaning of the text . .
153.

does not limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of each text.").

See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 165 (relying on the legislature to enact details for broad

statutes).
154. See HarrisFuneralHome Transcript, supra note 148 (recognizing the presence of
textual evidence, and stating that this case is not about "extra-textual stuff').
155.

Cf id (rejecting a textualism approach and instead directing the Court towards the

"massive social upheaval that would be entailed in such a decision").
156.

See William Eskridge, Symposium: Textualism's Moment of Truth, SCOTUS BLOG

(Sept. 4, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/20 19/09/symposium-textualisms-momentof-truth/ [https://perma.cc/L43W-GGJH] (emphasizing the importance of theories such as
textualism to be used equally and in the same manner across the cases in order for theories to be
considered "neutral").

157.

See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78-79 (describing Justice Scalia's rationale in applying strict

textualism to a Title VII dispute resulting in an opinion supporting a more liberal social policy).
158. See Eskridge, supra note 156 ("The credibility of textualism as a neutral methodology
depends on the court's deciding cases like Bostock's without regard to partisan biases"); see also

Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 17-1618)
[Hereinafter Bostock Transcript] (demonstrating how a majority of Justice Gorsuch's questioning
revolved around the text).
159. See HarrisFuneralHome Transcript, supra note 148 (providing Justice Gorsuch's
statements agreeing that the textual evidence is close).
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consider "the massive social upheaval" caused by its decision. 16 Justice
Gorsuch appeared to suggest that when the textual analysis is close and
the Court's decision would entail profound social change, the Court
should, out of judicial modesty, decide against coverage and declare the
task to be legislative. 161 This approach, however, raises unwieldy
questions for textualism as an interpretative methodology. 162
First, how will the Court determine whether textual coverage is a close
call? 1 6 3

During oral argument, for example, Justice Elena Kagan

described the textual analysis as "firmly" in favor of coverage, whereas
Justice Gorsuch called it "close." 1 6 4 Second, how will the Court
determine whether its decision would entail "massive social
upheaval?"

165

As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out during

arguments, "[n]o one ever thought sexual harassment was encompassed
by discrimination on the basis of sex in [1964]."166
The Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.

Vinson-holding that sexual harassment is discrimination because of sex
under Title VII-undoubtedly entailed profound social change,
particularly when viewed from the perspective of the mores of 1964.167
Indeed, the "social upheaval" of the Meritor decision continues to
reverberate today. 168 Justice Gorsuch's suggested approach could call
even the Meritor decision into question.

169

160.
161.

Id at 26.
Id at 26-27.

162.

See Eskridge, supra note 156 (explaining that the Supreme Court's legitimacy rests

upon a perception that its members are applying existing law in a neutral manner).
163.

See HarrisFuneralHome Transcript, supra note 148 (discussing a hypothetical where

Justice Gorsuch assumes the textual evidence is very close without describing the methodology to
arrive at that conclusion).
164.

Compare Bostock Transcript, supra note 158 ("[T]he text of the statute appears to

be firmly in Ms. Karlan's corner"), with Harris Funeral Home Transcript, supra note 148
("[The textual evidence] is close.").
165.

See, e.g., HarrisFuneralHome Transcript, supranote 148 (discussing the change in

views on sex discrimination's relation to sexual harassment from 1964 to today).

166.
167.
168.

Id at 58.
477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
See, e.g., Rafia Zakaria, The Legal System Needs to Catch Up With the #MeToo

Movement, NATION (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-legal-systemneeds-to-catch-up-with-the-metoo-movement/
[https://perma.cc/ZL97-R6GV]
(demonstrating
how Meritor's decision continues to influence the United States today).
169. See Harris FuneralHome Transcript, supra note 148 at 58 (cautioning the Court on
the implications of its decision causing social upheaval).
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Moreover, although Justice Gorsuch and oral arguments in general
focused on the purported demise of sex-specific bathrooms and dress
codes as the "social upheaval" caused by a decision favoring coverage;
should the Court also consider the profound social harms implicated by a
court decision against coverage? 1 70 In other words, should the Court
shake off its judicial modesty and make the close call for textual coverage
because the harms would otherwise be devastating?1 "
Justice Sonia
Sotomayor raised this point when she asked the question of when the
Court should step in to address invidious discrimination against lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender persons where-in her view-such
discrimination fit the statutory words. 172 A decision by the Court for
coverage would address invidious workplace discrimination and clearly
promote Title VII's statutory purpose.
B.

Opportunities Seized and Lost

One of the most important ways to dismantle discrimination at its roots
is through an effective public education campaign.1 7 3 Considering the
national conversation about the lack of federal nondiscrimination
protections for LGBTQ+ workers, the Supreme Court's decision to hear
these three cases provides a valuable educational opportunity about this
topic.l" The media coverage about these cases has served to further

170. See, e.g., id at 60-61 (describing the consequences of decisions which would in turn
then cause the social upheaval).
171.

See, e.g., id (asking when the Court should step in when it comes to addressing

discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals when the discrimination falls within the relevant
statute).
172.

See

id

("... may I just ask, at what point does a court continue to permit invidious

discrimination against groups that, where we have a difference of opinion, we believe the language
of the statute is clear."); see also Brief of William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Andrew M. Koppelman as

Amici Curiae in Support of Emps. at 2, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (Nos. 171618, 17-1623, 18-107), 2019 WL 2915046 at 2 [Hereinafter Eskridge & KoppelmanAmici Curiae]
(arguing that where textual coverage is ambiguous, the "Court should consider the statutory plan
or purpose," and "Title VII's stated purpose is to purge the workplace of criteria that Congress
found unrelated to an employee's 'ability or inability to work"').
173. See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2018-2022 (2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/strategic
plan_18-22.cfm
[https://perma.cc/Y5NM-M5SE] (outlining a plan to prevent employment discrimination through
education and outreach in order to aid citizens in understanding employment discrimination).
174.

See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Can Someone be Firedfor Being Gay? The Supreme Court

Will Decide, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/us/politics/
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educate the American public about the humanity of lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender people, and the role of the Supreme Court in addressing
the need for nondiscrimination protections. 1"
However, Supreme Court oral arguments in Aimee Stephens' case, in
important respects, missed a historic opportunity to provide a platform

for correctly educating the public about what it means to be
transgender.176 A transgender person's inherent and deeply held sense
of their gender is their authentic identity. 177 That gender identity is
deeply felt and inherently sensed-a core aspect of personhood. 178 It
means a "transgender woman is a woman" and a "transgender man is a
man."

17 9

A crucial part of representing transgender persons in

discrimination cases is to clearly and consistently present the authenticity
of their transgender identity and counter arguments that deny or diminish
such. 18

supreme-court-fired-gay.html

[https://perma.cc/8YV4-6MEL]
someone can still be fired for being gay.").
175.

("In more than half the states,

See, e.g., Because of Sex, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/

2019/11/07/podcasts/the-daily/transgender-supreme-court.html

[https://perma.cc/HA7R-D4Y3]

(humanizing the transgender issue by sharing a deeply personal experience); Roger Parloff, Three
LGBTQ Cases Are Set to Put the Supreme Court'sConservative Principleson Trial, NEWSWEEK

(Sept. 24, 2019, 9:53 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/2019/10/04/supreme-court-scalia-lgbtqrights-title-vii-1460838.html [https://perma.cc/ZGJ5-3F9X] (balancing the roles partisan ideology
and impartial interpretation play in Supreme Court decisions-especially for LGBTQ+ issues).
176. See Harris Funeral Home Transcript, supra note 148 at 64 (framing the issue as
Stephens' being discharged for appearing "insufficiently masculine" instead of clarifying that
Stephens is a woman).

&

177. See Brief of AMA, Am. Coll. of Physicians & 14 Additional Med., Mental Health

Health Care Org. as Amici Curiae in Support of Emps. at 4-5, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct.

1599 (2019) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107), 2019 WL 3003459 at 4-5 [Hereinafter AMA et al.,
Amici Curiae]("[T]ransgender individuals have a 'gender identity' -a 'deeply felt, inherent sense'
of their gender that is not aligned with the sex assigned to them at birth.").
178.

Cf id at 5 (citing more than four dozen studies demonstrating the consensus among

health care professionals regarding what it means to be transgender).

179.

Id

180.

See Alexander

Chen, The Supreme Court Doesn't Understand Transgender

People, SLATE (Oct. 18, 2019, 3:11 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/10/supremecourt-transgender-discrimination-sex.html

[https://perma.cc/GZ45-7Q5A]

(describing that the

presentation of transgender discrimination cases must "embrac[e] the reality of transgender
identity, which includes the reality that transgender people thrive when they are permitted to live
authentically as the men and women that they are."); see also Paisley Currah, The Aimee Stephens

Case:

On the Problem with Describing a Trans Woman as an "Insufficiently Masculine"

Biological Male (Oct. 15, 2019), https://paisleycurrah.com/2019/10/15/the-aimee-stephens-caseon-the-problem-with-describing-a-trans-woman-as-an-insufficiently-masculine-biological-male/
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Unfortunately, Stephens' counsel argued that she was fired for being
"insufficiently masculine," as opposed to arguing she was in fact, a
transgender woman." 1 8 1 Justice Roberts, for example, suggested that a
transgender employee claiming denial of bathroom access consistent with
their gender identity would suffer no injury based on biological sex, but
would be injured when the claim is analyzed in terms of transgender
status. 182 An alternatively framed argument, such as consistently
referring to Stephens as a transgender woman who was fired because she
did not meet the gender stereotype that all women are assigned the sex
female at birth, would have better reflected the reality that Stephens is a
woman. 183 Such a framing would also have facilitated arguing that as a
transgender woman Stephens must be permitted to use the women's
bathroom.
C.

184

Perseverance

I often advise prospective law school students that a primary quality
for success in law school and in a law career is perseverance. These three
Supreme Court cases showcase decades of persevering hard work by
countless advocates for LGBTQ+ workplace equality. 1 8 5 Indeed,
advocacy through strategic litigation is a long road filled with difficulties,

[https://perma.cc/SR8Q-MUAJ] (emphasizing the importance in Title VII cases of consistently
referring to a plaintiff who is a transgender woman as female and "to frame the plaintiff in clear
and consistent terms that correspond to their actual lived identity and experience").
181. See HarrisFuneral Home Transcript, supra note 148 at 64 (miseducating what it
means to be transgender while presenting significant drawbacks to their legal strategy); see also
Chen, supra note 180 (highlighting the drawbacks of framing Stephens as an insufficiently
masculine male by failing "to explain why she must be able to live and work as a woman, including
when using the restroom or dressing for work").
182. See HarrisFuneralHome Transcript, supra note 148 at 8-14 (comparing the analysis
of the bathroom case on the basis of biological sex with the analysis in terms of transgender status).
183.

See Chen, supra note 180 (recognizing the inconsistency between arguing Stephens is

a biological man and arguing she should be permitted to use the women's restroom).

184.

See Lusardi v. McHugh, No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756 (EEOC Apr. 1, 2015)

(holding a federal agency discriminated based on sex by denying a transgender employee equal
access to a common restroom used by other employees of the same gender identity regardless of
the negative reactions of other employees).

185.

See Bostock, 723 F. App'x at 964-65 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming the lower court's

dismissal of Bostock's sex discrimination complaint); see also R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc., 884 F.3d at 572, 574 (finding discrimination against an employee for failing to conform to the
dress code of her perceived gender); Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112-13 (recognizing that discrimination
against one's sexual orientation falls under the broader umbrella of "sex discrimination").
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failures, opposition, opportunities, and successes.186 We are at a pivotal
and historic juncture in the American LGBTQ+ civil rights

movement.187

The Supreme Court's decisions in these cases could

present major and devastating setbacks, surprising and sweeping wins, or

'

muddled and confused compromises. Whatever the outcome, LGBTQ+
legal advocates will continue to have their work cut out for them. 188 For
example, the oral arguments showed an utmost need to continue
educating ourselves, the judiciary, and the community at large about the
shared humanity and authenticity of transgender people. 1 8 9 The focus
must be to steadfastly continue strategic, prudential, and multifaceted
action to achieve LGBTQ+ workplace equality and justice
nationwide. 19

186. Cf Parloff, supra note 175 (signifying the conflict between the Supreme Court creating
precedent by relying on legal principles or by relying on the Court's political biases).
187. See generally id (emphasizing the major consequences that recent Title VII litigation
will have on workplace discrimination for the LGBTQ+ community).
188. See Yuki Noguchi, Sexual Harassment Cases Often Rejected by Courts, NPR,
https://www.npr.org/20 17/1 1/28/565743374/sexual-harassment-cases-often-rejected-by-courts
(Nov. 28, 2017) [https://perma.cc/F7P2-XXD7] (describing the recent increase in sexual
harassment claims, but also the increase in dismissals of such cases); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination).
189.

See, e.g., HarrisFuneral Home Transcript, supra note 148 at 8-14 (demonstrating a

lack of understanding of what it means to be transgender and lack of education on the rights of
transgender individuals).
190. See generally U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 173 (advocating
to prevent and remedy unlawful employment discrimination and to advance equality of opportunity
in the workplace).
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